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1. Introduction 
One of the aftermaths of World War Two was a tremendous imbalance 
between supply and demand. On the supply side, the hostilities had 
seriously undermined production capacity in Europe. Millions of people 
had been killed or wounded, while others had become desperately poor or 
were in bad health because of malnutrition and illness. To a large 
extent the means of production, houses, and means of transport had been 
destroyed; replacement and new investment had been postponed. The stock 
of cattle had decreased, fertilizer and fuel had become scarce, and 
much farm land had been flooded or damaged. This resulted in low 
productivity, low production and low exports. 
On the demand side, the amount of money available was enormous. 
The war effort of Germany and the Allies had been financed largely on 
the money markets; the German nation had also used the money markets of 
the occupied countries. Thus after the war the purchasing power of the 
private sector was enormous, even as many people had become poor also. 
Apart of this, reconstruction had to be financed. The huge 
disequilibrium between low productive capacity on the one hand and 
increased money supply on the other hand led to high inflationary 
pressure and excess demand (see paragraph 2). 
In theory inflationary pressure and excess demand can be 
neutralized in several ways. In the short term, a monetary purge or 
currency reform decreases excess demand drastically. However, it will 
only have a temporary success, because the purge does not eliminate the 
original cause of the increase in the money supply i.e. continuing 
government deficits in Europe. When the money supply has become 
excessive, a monetary reform may be seen as an essential step towards 
monetary equilibrium, although it will not be sufficiënt in itself. An 
excess of imports over exports will also drain the supply of money. In 
the longer term, an increase in production has the same effect; this 
solution coincides with an excess of imports where the imports are used 
for purposes of production. However, foreign deficits are only possible 
so long as international reserves, possibilities of monetization of 
investments abroad and of foreign assistance are not exhausted. Price 
increases and rationing will frustrate inflationary pressure too; 
these, like currency reforms, have the disadvantage that they do not 
affect the roots of the problem of an excessive money supply. 
During the postwar reconstruction the disinflation policies 
mentioned above were implemented in Western Europe. Many countries 
introduced currency reforms and all countries used trade-balance 
deficits as a means of stimulating production. Some countries, notably 
Italy and France, did not control prices to the same extent as the 
others, which also applied rationing controls. The excess of imports in 
most countries of Western Europe was activated by an overvaluation of 
currency. This policy made imports cheaper and in this way prevented 
price increases; the policy also discouraged exports, thereby 
stimulating the balance of payments deficits. In order to limit these 
deficits, trade and exchange controls were applied; with the exception 
of Belgium, which abolished many import restrictions soon after the 
cessation of hostilities. All Western European countries, moreover, 
were forced to pursue a bilateral balance of payments equilibrium, 
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because of scarce foreign currencies and the absence of multilateral 
clearing. This bilateralism, together with the absence of the Eastern 
European and German markets, hindered trade and made Western Europe 
more dependent on non-European markets, especially the United States1. 
State intervention in Western Europe became normalized after the 
second world war. The classic economie view of a spontaneously 
developing equilibrium had seemed to be inadequate during the 
Interbellum; instability and inflexibility on various markets had 
crippled the effects of the classical economie tools. After the war a 
strong desire existed in most countries to build a new society in a new 
way. Governments began to plan, nationalize and invest in order to 
reconstruct the economy. Programs for the redistribution of wealth were 
started to allow labourers a share: social security was improved, 
taxes made more progressive, and even some participation in decisions 
of national and company interest was instituted. The new economie 
theory of John Maynard Keynes with its emphasis on demand management 
fitted in perfectly with this new desire for state intervention. In a 
way Keynesianism became the postwar legitimization of state action, 
although Keynes did not prescribe the control system that was 
initially applied by many countries initially. This state action was 
inward looking and resisted influence from outside that would affect 
the planned reconstruction. Consequently there was opposition to 
American action in restoring f ree trade as soon as possible, although 
the aid offered by the Americans was gladly accepted2. 
1
 The Western European countries each had their own political and 
economie ends and foliowed separate paths of recovery. The only 
important European trade agreement until 1952 was the European Payments 
Union (EPU) in 1950, a multilateral payment scheme that was started 
with working capital provided by the United States. This country was 
interested in free trade; it feared trade discrimination that could 
result from European bilateral trade agreements and deficits. This idea 
dominated its foreign policy, which was primarily anti-colonial, open 
door-minded and favoured world wide trade liberalization and 
multilateralism. The increase in trade possibilities was one of the 
aims of US efforts to improve multilateral cooperation in Western 
Europe. For instance immediately after the war the United Kingdom and 
France were offered credit, if they agreed to cooperate in establishing 
a new mechanism of multilateral trade throughout the world. The Bretton 
Woods agreement was also part of this policy, as was the Marshall Plan. 
2
 Because there was no agreement about the economie and political 
future of Germany, Allied policies concerning Germany were indecisive 
in the early postwar years; recovery for instance was extremely 
sluggish due to the division of the country into four occupation zones. 
The important northwestern zones were designated as dollar zones. Thus 
Western Europe was deprived of German coal, steel and capital goods 
exports, because of low German production and dollar shortages. After 
the beginning of the Cold War hostility to Eastern Europe also altered 
the pattern of trade; relatively more food products had to be imported 
from outside Europe. 
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One of the most urgent problems facing most European countries was 
an excess of liquidity. For this reason in the period 1944-1952 twenty-
four currency reforms were executed in order to cut the money supply. 
Some of these decreased purchasing power drastically, while others had 
only less severe effects. We will concentrate on the different types of 
reform that were applied throughout Europe. One specific country will 
be used as example of each type of reform: the Soviet Union, Belgium, 
and West Germany (see paragraph 3). However, in most countries excess 
demand did not disappear; rather was stimulated by the reconstruction 
effort, which mostly had to be financed on the money and capital 
markets. In some countries this necessitated a repetition of the 
currency reform (see table 1). 
Because of low productive capacity the reconstruction effort also 
resulted in high imports and a huge deficit on the current account of 
the balance of payments, especially vis-a-vis the United States. A so-
called dollar shortage existed that ultimately led to the 
implementation of the European Recovery Program (ERP) or Marshall Plan, 
which was primarily a program of American aid in kind. Like the 
currency reforms, the Marshall Plan was an important moment in 
reconstruction. The discussion on the need for the ERP has been 
reopened by Alan S. Milward. I shall use this discussion as my point of 
departure in reviewing the economie reconstruction policies that were 
carried out in Western Europe (see paragraph 4). Eastern Europe, under 
the guidance of the Soviet Union, chose another road to recovery. 
Because it is not of interest for the postwar reconstruction of the 
Netherlands, the Eastern European situation will not be analysed, 
except for the types of monetary purges that were implemented, which 
were not limited to Eastern Europe. 
Gradually reconstruction in Western Europe advanced. In the 
dominant western economie view this meant that market forces had to be 
strengthened again. This resulted in devaluation, the third important 
moment in reconstruction, and in the abolition of most control systems 
in the late fourties and early fifties (see paragraph 5). These 
measures symbolized the end of recovery and the start of economie 
expansion, which were so succesfull in the 1950s and 1960s. 
2. Causes of excess liquidity in Europe 
After the war all European countries experienced an excess of 
liquidity that endangered normal price movements. Germany had imposed 
war expenditures on the occupied countries, especially in Western 
Europe, and these countries had incur debts at home. They had financed 
about 12% of the German expenditures of approximately 700 billion 
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Reichsmarks during the period 1939-19453. The forced payments even 
exceeded the sum of German tax receipts in the years 1943 and 1944 
together. 
To begin with, the occupied countries had to pay occupation costs. 
The compensation for the stationing of troops had been increased during 
the war years. The growing costs had to be financed on the money and 
capital markets of the occupied countries. Furthermore, contributions 
had to be made to the German war effort in Eastern Europe. The 
commodity trade imbalance between exports to and imports from Germany 
increased. The exports were not all paid for. In addition to this 
extortion, Germany, in order to increase the war contribution of the 
occupied territory, had decided to overvalue the Reichsmark in relation 
to foreign currency. The exchange rate for the French franc for 
instance was overvalued by roughly 50%4. 
Germany had also extorted a great deal of money from Belgium. 
During the first phase of the occupation Germany introduced a so-called 
spearhead currency in the occupied countries, the Reichskreditkassen-
scheine, which could not be used in the country itself. It considered 
the Kassenscheine as legal tender and used them to spend as much as was 
thought necessary. The Belgian monetary authorities, however, 
considered the new currency a threat to the economy. The bank of issue 
in 1941 successfully started the exchange of Kassenscheine for francs 
thus reducing the amount of spearheadcurrency in circulation. The bill 
of 4.3 billion francs was presented to the Treasury. I n t h e 
commodity trade almost the same happened. Because of the war effort 
German imports increased while exports decreased. In exchange for a 
claim on Germany, the Belgian state was forced to furnish Germany with 
francs to finance the occupation the Belgian credit amounted to 62.7 
billion francs5. The occupation costs paid to Germany were 67 billion 
francs6. Nominal purchasing power had risen to a more than threefold, 
3
 Karl-Heinrich Hansmeyer and Rolf Caesar, Kriegswirtschaft und 
Inflation (1936-1948), page 402. Angus Maddison in Economie Policy and 
Performance in Europe 1913-1970 on page 467/8 even thinks that it was 
104 billion Reichsmarks. 
4
 Alan S. Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, page 137. 
Charles P. Kindleberger, A Financial History of Western Europe, page 
104. 
5
 Léon H. Dupriez, Monetary Reconstruction in Belgium, page 4. 
6
 Altogether the costs were 140.1 billion francs, including in-
demnities to German nationals (340 million francs), costs of the bil-
leting of German troops (5.8 billion francs), the export surplus, and 
the amount of Reichskreditkassenscheine. See Léon H. Dupriez. page 5. 
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to 164.3 billion francs7. The total of state expenditures in Belgium 
during the four years of occupation was 160.9 billion francs, a 
multiple of the expenditures in the four years bef ore the war. State 
income during the war came to 68.5 billion (3.4 billion francs because 
of the issue of small coins included), which left nearly 91.6 billion 
francs to be financed otherwise. Only 5.2 billion of this was obtained 
through long term loans, 13.9 billion through Treasury bills, and 72.5 
billion through medium and short term loans. The latter could be 
converted by the holders at an inconvenient moment for the State. As a 
comparison, in 1938 the govemment had a debt of 44.9 billion francs. 
All this meant that the liquidity of the private sector in Belgium had 
reached the level of 240 billion francs; in 1938 this had been 54.2 
billion. Because production had fallen to far below normal, excess 
liquidity was enormous. 
When Germany had been beaten and the occupied nations had obtained 
control over their own territory again, a great deal of recovery 
spending had to be done. In all Western European countries the 
reinstalled authorities were also expected to be generous in furnishing 
the Allied troops with local currency for which they would later be 
compensated. This further increased liquidity. 
The monetary situation in Germany was much the same. Although a 
great deal of money had been extorted from the occupied countries, and 
taxes increased at home, 55% of the German war efforts had been 
financed by means of internal debts. The German administration had 
suppressed inflation by a system of price and wage control, and 
rationing, which they had introduced in other countries as well. From 
1944 on, the effectivity of the control system had decreased. Bcause of 
this the trust in the Reichsmark (RM) disappeared. Inflation was to 
appear when production declined and purchasing power increased8. This 
resulted in rising black market prices. When the German Reich 
collapsed, excess liquidity was tremendous. The sum of all liquidities 
amounted to RM 300 billion, a multiple of the situation before the war; 
the money supply came to RM 73 billion, saving deposits to RM 125 
billion and other bankdeposits to RM 100 billion. The division of the 
Reich decreased the excess liquidity in the three western zones to RM 
7
 Léon H. Dupriez, page 6. He defined the nominal purchasing power 
as the sum of small coins and notes, National Bank notes, Luxemburg 
notes, current accounts of the central bank, accounts of the post-check 
system and the current accounts in banks. This definition of purchasing 
power is used only in relation with Belgium. 
8
 Production declined because of damage caused by the war, and 
because of the physical condition of the German population. The 
division of Germany into four zones, forced deliveries to other 
countries, the almost complete isolation from world trade, the decrease 
of the number of officials, and the removal of important managers 
played an important role as well. 
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173 billion in the spring of 19479. 
More and more the Reichsmark ceased to be unit of account, store 
of wealth and means of payment, except for the purchase of the 
official rations. Nevertheless, a currency reform was not executed by 
the Allies10; the German economy therefore rapidly became a barter 
economy:1x 
. . . individuals and business firms acquired most of the 
commodities they wanted by exchange against commodities 
they had to offer, and a whole series of exchanges were 
sometimes necessary to obtain the desired commodity. 
Every firm had several specialists, called "compensa-
tors", on its staf f. If, for example, cardboard for 
packing was needed, the compensator might be obliged to 
barter the plant's own products for typewriters, the 
typewriters for shoes, and the shoes for cardboard." 
Firms also had to pay their employees in kind. Thus coal miners were 
payed partly in coal. This enabled the miners to barter coal for food 
and other desired consumer goods. 
All normal economie incentives had ceased to work. Exports were 
not profitable as long as they were determined by dictated internal 
prices. Imports did not stimulate the restoration of the economy 
either, because imported goods immediately disappeared from the 
official market, and were hoarded as 'wertbestandige Güter', or sold at 
the black markets. Employees were not interested in more money, so 
higher wages to encourage productivity did not work either. 
Absenteeism for one or two days a week was more interesting for the 
employees because that saved them time to cultivate food themselves , 
and to barter books, appliances, lamps, and the like for food, 
especially in the bad winter of 1946/7 and after the poor harvest of 
1947. 
The Soviet Union had to deal with the same problems as Germany. 
Even before the war the production of consumer goods was insufficiënt 
to satisfy the purchasing power of the population because of planning 
problems; the production of consumer goods was nearly always smaller 
than planned, income payments were not. The war effort and the 
dominance of war-productlon worsened this imbalance. Furthermore, the 
9
 Deutsche Bundesbank, Wahrung und Wirtschaft in Deutschland 1876-
1975, pages 418-419. In the middle of 1939 the money supply was RM 11 
billion (page 417), in the middle of 1936 it was RM 6.35 billion. 
10
 The four Allies disagreed on several points. This delayed the 
currency reform for at least two years. 
11
 F.A. Lutz, The German Currency Reform and the Revival of the 
German Economy, page 122. 
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debt of the State increased in spite of the imposition of a special 
direct war tax and the intensification of the drive for more money 
through the sale of government bonds, and through contributions to 
defense funds and voluntary donations to the State. Soviet banks 
supplied the money to cover the deficits. Inflation was more or less 
suppressed by a rationing system that also distributed many scarce 
products12. The government also allowed one f ree market where farmers 
were allowed to sell their surplus products. Purchasing power therefore 
found its way to the open market, not to a black market. As a 
supplement to this 'kolchoz market', and as one of the measures against 
the money overhang, the government decided to open nonration or 
commercial stores in 194413. These stores sold the same consumer goods 
as the ration stores, as well as a number of others, at prices that 
were considerably higher. 
After the war the special war tax was abolished. The collection of 
voluntary donations and the contributions to the defense funds had to 
be ended as well. State expenditures, however, could not be reduced 
because of the reconstruction that was needed; vast areas of the Soviet 
Union for instance had been devastated during the war. For this reason 
excess liquidity increased. This meant that the monetary problems, 
caused mainly by the war, were not over yet. 
3. European currency reforms 
The excess liquidity was a big problem for the reconstruction 
effort. The danger of a huge inflation was immanent. Many countries 
therefore decided to cut the money supply drastically. Of the countries 
that participated in the war only the United Kingdom and Italy did not 
make use of a monetary purge. 
The currency reforms of course differed in form and had various 
degrees of success; Poland, France, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and 
Rumania had to repeat the reform. John Gurley made a typology of 
European currency reforms that is useful for this exposé. He 
distinguished three different types (see table 1). 
12
 Paul A. Baran, Currency Reform in the USSR, page 198, estimates 
that price rise from 1940 to 1947 was 202%. 
13
 Fritz Grotius, Die europaischen Geldreformen nach dem zweiten 
Weltkrieg, page 319/20. During the war also the so-called commission 
stores came into existence. They mainly bought and sold used consumer 
goods. Producer-cooperative stores existed too; they sold handicraft 
products and repairs. Both kind of shops charged prices on the same 
level as the nonration stores. 
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Table 1-Classification of European currency reforms 
country month and year of reform type 
1 2 3 
Belgium October 1944 X 
Greece November 1944 X 
Poland 1 December 1944 X 
Yugoslavia April 1945 X 
France 1 June 1945 X 
Austria 1 July 1945 X 
Denmark July 1945 X 
Norway September 1945 X 
Netherlands September 1945 X 
Czechoslovakia October 1945 X 
Austria 2 November 1945 X 
Hungary 1 December 1945 X 
Finland December 1945 X 
Hungary 2 August 1946 X 
Bulgaria 1 May 1947 X 
Rumania 1 August 1947 X 
Austria 3 November 1947 X 
USSR December 1947 X 
France 2 January 1948 X 
West Germany June 1948 X 
East Germany June 1948 X 
Poland 2 October 1950 X 
Rumania 2 January 1951 X 
Bulgaria 2 May 1952 X 
Source: John G. Gurley, Excess Liquidity and Euro-
pean Monetary Reforms 1944-1952, page 80. 
Firstly there were the money purges that reduced the supply of 
liquid assets through the exchange of old banknotes and bankdeposits 
for new ones at rates below one. No blocking measures were taken to 
support the cut in liquidity and the economie subjects were free to 
spend the remaining money. This type of reform was introduced by the 
two European countries that experienced inflation of more than a 50% 
price rise a month, namely Greece (November 1944) and Hungary (December 
1945). Later on the USSR (December 1947) foliowed, immitated by Poland 
(1950) Rumania (1952) and Bulgaria (1952). In Eastern European 
countries the currency reform was used against the capitalists and for 
the collectivization; unfavorable conversion rights were given to 
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independent farmers and entrepreneurs14. 
Within this type of currency reform differences occurred in 1) the 
rate of exchange accorded between old and new currency; 2) the exchange 
right permitted to holders of various types of liquid assets, for 
instance to holders of bankdeposits in contrast to holders of 
banknotes; 3) the exchange rights granted to owners in possession of 
differing amounts of liquid assets. This last aspect shows the 
redistributive effect that countries, especially in Eastern Europe, 
sought to achieve by giving large asset holders unfavorable terms on 
which their old assets could be exchanged. The fourth difference was 
the rate of exchange permitted looking at the identity of the owner of 
the assets. 
The identity of the subjects was not important in the currency 
reform that was applied in the USSR in December 194715, although a 
similar effect was reached by a combination of the former three 
measures. The exchange rate of conversion was fixed at ten old rubles 
to one new ruble. Deposits of individuals at banks and saving 
institutions were exetnpted from this rule. They were converted 
following a sliding scale: credit balances up to 3.000 rubles at par, 
the next slice to 10.000 rubles at three rubles to two, and balances 
above 10.000 rubles at two old rubles to one new ruble. Nearly all 
public debt was decreased to one third. The deposits of cooperatives 
and collective enterprises depreciated from five old rubles to four new 
ones. The motivation behind this discrimination in favour of these 
production units was that they used their deposits more for production 
ends than for consumption ends16. Current income of Soviet citizens 
such as wages and pensions was not depreciated, but money in transit 
such as money orders and bank transfers was subjected to the same 
conversion ratio as normal money: ten to one. This currency reform was 
accompanied by the abolition of the rations, and by changes in the 
prices of consumer goods. 
The farmers were the most affected, because cash on hand was hit 
hardest. In the period before they had accumulated large amounts of 
money at the kolchoz market. The- other sections of the population had 
not been able to spend much of their income on food and other consumer 
goods because of the rations and the scarcity in the nonration stores. 
The kolchoz market therefore was the most important place where they 
could satisfy their consumer needs. The farmers who could not spend 
14
 In Bulgaria (1952), Rumania (1952) and Czechoslovakia (1953) 
also blocked accounts representing compensation for nationalized 
property were written off (see Edward Ames, Soviet Bloc Currency 
Conversions, page 339, note 2). 
15
 In 1947 the supply of consumer goods had been improved very 
much. That is why the Soviets thought the end of 1947 to be the first 
opportunity to abolish rationing and to drain the money supply. 
16
 Charles Bettelheim, La Réforme Monetaire Soviétique, page 342. 
See also Fritz Grotius, pages 319-323, and Paul A. Baran. 
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their money in the other shops either, took most of it home, and lost a 
huge part of it during the currency reform. The others, who had 
hoarded less money and had deposited more in the banks, were less 
affected. 
In a second type of currency reform a portion of the supply of 
liquid assets was immobilized by blocking. The banknotes were called in 
and put on bankaccounts, which together with the other deposits could 
not be used. Only giro transfers to a limited extent were allowed. All 
assets were valued at par but only a small portion could be exchanged 
for new currency ( see table 2)« The deblocking of the reroaining 
deposits was a process that took years. 
Some currency programmes of this type were limited in scope. In 
France (January 1948) blocking provisions were employed for 5000 franc 
notes only, in Finland (December 1945) for 500, 1000 and 5000 mark 
banknotes17. Other programmes were more extensive, in Austria, Belgium 
and Czechoslovakia for example (see table 2). Other countries that used 
this type of currency reform were Poland (1944), Bulgaria (1947), 
Denmark and Norway. More emphasis will be placed on this type of reform 
than to the other two types, because it was applied in the 
Netherlands. Belgium will be used as an example. 
table 2-Maximum allotments of new currency in initial exchange 
country amount per person in dollars 
Austria 
Belgium 
Czechoslovakia 
Netherlands 
150 shillings 
2000 francs 
500 korunas 
10 guilder 
15.00 
45.60 
10.00 
3.75 
Source: Lloyd A. Met zier, The Colm-Dodge -Gold smith Plan Ap-
pendix 0, page 371 
In Belgium extensive conversion preparations had already been 
made before the end of the German occupation in October 1944. 
Experiences af ter World War One led to this swift way of acting. The 
government-in-exile ordered the printing of new currency in the United 
Kingdom and the administration in Brussels secretly prepared the 
organizational part of the currency reform in Belgium. Disagreement 
existed in Brussels about the type of the reform18 . One group was in 
17
 In Finland the banknotes were depreciated to 50% and cut in 
two. The left side could be exchanged for new currency and the right 
side was converted into a three year forced loan to the State with an 
interest of 2%. All banknotes with a value below 500 mark could be 
exchanged at par value. 
See Léon H. Dupriez, page 13-16. 
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favour of blocking and consolidating all excess liquidity. Next, heavy 
taxation would be necessary to reimburse the public debt and to injure 
war profiteers. A second group suggested a decrease in the value of 
money without creating any public debt. The group called in question 
that the prolonged and difficult fiscal remedies of a public debt could 
be brought into correct relation with the monetary reform. Taxes could 
then be used for other purposes, such as war damage indemnities. The 
decrease of the value of money would especially hit large liquid asset 
holders such as war profiteers. The government-in-exile decided in 
favour of the first alternative; a franc would be exchanged for a 
franc. 
The magnitude of the money contraction was decided upon after the 
determination of a new exchange rate. Although a definite exchange 
rate hardly could be calculated because of the turmoil, the Belgian 
government-in-exile opted for a depreciation of 17% in relation to the 
British pound sterling19. Using the theory of purchasing power 
parities, which compares the purchasing power of the currency in a 
country with the purchasing power of a second currency in a second 
country, it was now possible to determine a level of Belgian wages and 
prices, which kept the country competitive in relation to the United 
Kingdom20. Taking this wage and price parity, and considering pre-war 
monetary relations as normal, then a post-war Belgian money supply and 
purchasing power volume was calculated21. Comparing these outcomes with 
the actual amount in circulation, this means that roughly 50% of the 
money supply and 45% of the purchasing power had to be blocked, namely 
19
 Why this exchange rate? Léon H. Dupriez (page 10): "The 
obvious answer ... is that this rate had been the rate of the Congolese 
franc within the Sterling Area since June 1940 and that it therefore 
appeared as a sort of existing rate for the currency of free Belgium. 
... Four years later, the fear of upsetting the price system and the 
financial assets in the Congo certainly played a part in maintaining 
the [Congolese] sterling rate for Belgium itself." 
2 0
 The new exchange rate of 176.625 to the pound sterling was 
approximately 1.21 times the old exchange rate of 146 francs during the 
period 1931-1938. The wage and price level in the United Kingdom 
multiplied by the 1.21 had the outcome of a 1.45x1.21-1.00 = 75% wage 
increase compared to the pre-war average and a 1.35X1.21-1.00 = 63% 
price increase. The increase in wages permitted relieved the social 
pressure and grievances, which originated during the war, when wages 
lagged behind prices and prices on the black market were high. 
21
 With a price and wage parity level of 160 to 170 and an average 
pre-war circulation of coins, notes, bank and post-check deposits of 
49.6 billion francs (a 1936-1938 average) the new money supply would 
have to be 80 to 85 billion (49.6x160 = 79.3; 49.6x170 = 84.2). 
September 1944 the money supply was 164 billion francs. The purchasing 
power, i.e. money supply plus time and saving deposits, was calculated 
in the same way. September 1944 the purchasing power was 186 billion 
francs. See also V.A. de Ridder, 1948-1949, page 57, 69, and Léon H. 
Dupriez, page 6. 
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from 164 to 79-85 billion francs and from 186 to 101-107 billion francs 
respectively. 
On Friday evening, the 6th of October, Minister of Finance Gutt 
announced the currency reform. For organizational and safety reasons 
the government opted for a blockade at home: through the postal service 
every Belgian household received a form on which it had to report its 
holdings of all banknotes of 100 francs and higher (96% of the nation's 
cash) 2 2. The value of the notes not declared between the 9th and the 
13th of October accrued to the State. Every Belgian was allowed to 
convert a maximum of 2000 francs into new banknotes. This exchange 
operation was carried out in order to provide the Belgians with the 
liquid assets necessary to secure subsistence until they could live 
from their current income again. Between the 16th and the 29th of 
October the notes declared had to be deposited at post offices (only 
amounts up to 10 000 francs) and banks. The money was then credited on 
blocked accounts. Three weeks later an additional 3000 francs per 
person were released. Of the remainder 40% was declared frozen and 60% 
permanently blocked (see below). In addition, all sight, time and 
savings deposits at financial institutions, such as banks and the post-
check offices, were blocked. However, one important distinction was 
made compared with the handling of banknotes; the amount of deposits 
held when the Germans invaded Belgium was not blocked23. This 
distinction was to the advantage of higher-income groups. All banknotes 
and deposits held by the government, public and semi-public bodies, and 
financial institutions had to be declared only, and then were 
converted into new assets; the deposits remained completely free. On 
moral and social grounds later religious and philanthropic 
institutions also regained the disposal of all their liquid assets. 
The monetary reform had several aims2A: 1) to stimulate the 
Belgian economy through the reduction of excess demand (this in 
relation with the new exchange rate) ; 2) to support a wage and price 
stabilization programme; 3) to transform liquid asset holdings into 
2 2
 The smaller banknotes did not have to be handed in; these 
banknotes were issued bu another institution, 'Ie Trésor', and also 
ensured a minimum of money in circulation. In several countries 
organizational considerations were influential in the decision not to 
convert small currency. In Austria such currency became attractive to 
black marketeers. As a result it disappeared, and low-priced goods had 
to be increased in price to find buyers. In Belgium the 20 and 50 
franc banknotes also disappeared from circulation; they were hoarded 
in anticipation of a possible new currency reform. From the 28th of 
October 1946 until the 31st of July 1947 they could be converted into 
new money. Of the banknotes 90% and 77% were handed in respectively 
(see Valery Janssens, Le Franc beige, page 325). 
23
 Actually, the owner of the account had a choice between taking 
the entire amount of deposits, existing on the 9th of May 1940, or 
taking 10% of the total of deposits possessed on the 8th of October 
1944. See V.A. de Ridder, 1948-1949, page 59. 
2 4
 See Léon H. Dupriez, page 17-18 and Fritz Grotius, page 112-113. 
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public debt in order to make a recuperation of normal State budgetting 
possible; 4) to registrate all taxable assets, especially those of war 
profiteers; 5) to exclude Germans and collaborators from currency that 
could be recirculated at a later date; 6) to attack black market 
prices. During the first period the attack on the black market was 
fruitless, because this market was the only one where Belgians could 
buy the goods they wanted25. The Belgian government thought that the 
aims could be reached through the annulment of the use of the old 
banknotes, through credit control measures (reserve requirements and 
consolidation), through gradual deblocking and through taxation. 
The credit control measures were taken to prevent an undesirable 
expansion of the money supply of the banking system, which was in 
possession of large quantities of rediscountable Treasury bills. The 
due date, maturing before the 8th of October 1945, was prolonged for 
one year. The banks had to ask permission of the monetary authorities 
for all credits exceeding 1.000.000 francs, and interest on private 
credits was raised several times from 1946 on. 
The taxation scheme consisted of three taxes26. A special tax up 
to 100% on profits from transactions with the enemy. Distinction was 
made according to the degree of compulsion from German side, and to the 
origin of the increase of wealth. Without proof non-compulsory 
transaction with Germans was assumed. A second tax was imposed on 
excess profits, made between the lst of January 1940 and the 31st of 
December 1944. In this tax only the excess share of income and profit 
were taxed2 7 . Then there was also a capital levy of 5% on all private 
25
 Saturation of demand by enlarging supply proved to be the best 
way of combatting the black market. Belgium, in possession of a 
relative favourable supply of dollars and sterling, could pursue a 
liberal import policy in contrast with other nations. Nevertheless in 
Belgium the black market also endured longer than desired by the 
authorities. 
26
 To determine the total amount of wealth and the increase in 
wealth during the war on which the taxation scheme would be based, not 
only all banknotes and deposits had to be declared, but also all 
holdings of gold and foreign assets, and all Belgian and foreign 
securities. All securities had to be deposited at a bank, or otherwise 
became void and would be attributed to the State. To avoid trade in 
securities the stock exchange market was closed until June 1945. All 
life insurance policies, a source of investment of war profiteers, were 
blocked too, and had to be declared by the companies. Real property was 
checked through the cadastre. Furniture, jewels, commodities, etc. were 
excluded from this inventory of wealth. 
2 7
 The tax rates on excess income were: 
70% for amounts up to 100.000 francs; 
80% for amounts between 100.000 and 200.000 francs; 
90% for amounts between 200.000 and 1.000.000 francs; 
95% for amounts over 1.000.000 francs (see Léon H. Dupriez, page 34, 
and V.A. de Ridder, 1948-1949, page 66). 
Excess income was calculated in several ways, namely by deducting 
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capital. The levy was seen as a supplementary tax to raise the yield of 
the other two taxes, and as a contribution from the Belgians to the 
reconstruction of the country. For these reasons, exemptions granted 
were small. Additional to the taxation scheme an amnesty was 
proclaimed, asking the Belgians to declare truthfully the incomes 
earned during the war; these declarations would only be subject to a 
normal tax rate2 8. 
The taxation scheme was designed to neutralize an important part 
of the excess of demand and public debt. For these reasons 60% of the 
blocked accounts were permanently blocked; they were fixed at 63.2 
billion francs. These accounts would be compensated by the revenue of 
the three taxes, and the remainder would get the character of a normal 
public debt. At the end of December 1953 the outturn of the three taxes 
was 48.1 billion francs which was close to the original estimation of 
50 billion29. The other 40% of the blocked account were declared 
'frozen'. They were considered as the excess of liquidity during the 
period of low production. When economie activity progressed, the frozen 
accounts would be gradually defrozen in order to maintain a permanent 
equilibrium between supply of and demand for money. This release took 
place through general deblocking measures for the entire economy, for 
certain economie sectors of the economy, and for certain economie 
categories of the population (returned prisoners of war, political 
prisoners, and old people for instance). These measures were issued by 
the Minister of Finance. The defreeze also took place through specific 
deblocking for individuals, according to need. This deblocking was 
executed by a special 'Deblocking Committee' that was fairly generous 
from all profits the income and profits normally earned, declared and 
taxed during the five last tax years before 1940-1944, or by 
subtracting from gross profits a lump sum of 5000 francs a month, or, 
in the case of a firm, by deducting 6% of the capital invested. Several 
other deductions were allowed. But the most important deduction was 
created through the possibility to reduce taxable profits with an 
amount equal to the value of the stocks liquidated during the war, 
multiplied with a factor 1.6 (corresponding with the general price rise 
during the German occupation). This in order to facilitate the 
replacement of stocks and to safeguard the real assets of the firms 
(V.A. de Ridder, 1948-1949, page 65/6). 
The percentages of this tax on excess income were higher than in 
for instance Denmark and the Netherlands. In these countries, however, 
increase in value of estates was included in the tax (Léon H. Dupriez, 
page 35). 
2 8
 Additional receipts resulting from the fiscal amnesty were 
estimated at 110 million francs. In reality they amounted to 3.52 
billion francs (V.A. de Ridder, 1949-1950, page 33). 
29
 Nevertheless receipts lagged behind estimates during 1946 and 
1947, the first two years the taxes were collected. In 1946 receipts 
were only 73% of the estimates. This proportion remained the same in 
1947, although the estimates had been revised downwards (V.A. de 
Ridder, 1949-1950, page 33). 
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to industrial and commercial enterprises until their cash reserves were 
restored. After that the deblocking on social grounds gradually became 
more liberal30. 
Table 3 shows that soon after the blocking measures the money 
supply rapidly expanded again. For this several causes can be 
mentioned. First of all there were the temporary advances to the Allies 
that reached a maximum of 35 billion francs in December 1945; at the 
end of 1946 they were mostly payed back (the pay of Allied troops), or 
compensated in goods and services (Reverse Lend-Lease and Mutual Aid). 
Until December 1946 about 26 billion francs was added to the money 
table 3-The evolution of frozen accounts and money supply (a) (in 
billions of francs) 
frozen 
accounts 
(1) 
money 
supply 
(2) 
increase (3) in 
of (2) percentages 
(3) (4) 
Early Se] at. 1944 0 164.285 (b) 
Oct. 1944 39.1 (c) 57.400 (d) -106.885 
Dec. 31, 1944 37.0 (c) 74.256 16.856 
Dec. 31, 1945 22.5 131.522 57.266 77.1 
Dec. 31, 1946 14.0 145.567 14.045 10.7 
Dec. 31, 1947 10.0 151.217 5.650 3.9 
Dec. 31, 1948 2.6 162.239 11.022 7.3 
Dec. 31, 1949 0 166.802 4.563 2.8 
Dec. 31, 1950 171.910 (156 100)(e) 
Dec. 31, 1951 (168 547) 12.447 8.0 
Dec. 31, 1952 (174 541) 5.994 3.6 
Source: Valery Janssens, Le Franc beige, page 320 (column 1), page 
433/4 (column 2) 
(a) Bank notes, current accounts of the National Bank, bank accounts 
to 30 days and private checking accounts. 
(b) Léon H. Dupriez, page 6. 
(c) V.A. de Ridder, 1949-1950, page 28. 
(d) Léon H. Dupriez, page 22. 
(e) Changed calculation: without the money in the cash of the mone-
tary institutions. 
supply by the defreeze of accounts. Furthermore between December 1944 
and December 1946 commercial credits with a value of 10 billion francs 
were granted by the National Bank and private banks. The most important 
factor, however, was the deficit in the State budget. The direct 
3 0
 V.A. de Ridder, page 62. The total amount of deblocking by the 
committee was 7.2 billion francs (see Valery Janssens, page 320). 
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central bank advances to the government increased from approximately 17 
billion francs in October 1944, an estimation because of lack of 
official figures, to 47.1 billion at the end of 1946. During the same 
period the amount of free post-check deposits, used for current 
financing, increased from 6.7 billion francs at the end of 1944 to 21.1 
billion at the end of 1946. Of a total deficit of 72.9 billion francs 
in 1945 and 1946 combined, only 12 billion could be covered by long-
term loans. Also 6.5 billion francs was borrowed from Canada and the 
United States3 l. 
All in all this made the money supply increase to 145.6 billion 
francs in December 1946, or 89% of the amount just before the currency 
reform of 9 October 1944, while 14 billion francs was still left in 
f rozen accounts! At that time, production was only at the pre-war 
level. The economy of Belgium in December 1946 therefore was still 
threatened by inflation. In 1948 the growth of the money supply 
accelerated again, because of the deblocking of most of the 
frozen accounts (see table 3). The Korea-boom also caused a temporary 
acceleration. The aftermath of the currency reform lasted until the end 
of 1971 when the last financial obligations were payed off32. 
The third type of currency reform combined the deflated exchange 
rates with a freeze in blocked bank accounts of the remaining supply of 
currency and deposits. The reform applied by the three western Allies 
in West Germany is a perfect example of this combination of monetary 
measures. 
By the middle of 1948 the German economy was almost paralyzed. 
Cigarettes, coffee and tea had become the most appreciated units of 
account and means of payment. Especially cigarettes were inflationproof 
and had a stable exchange rate. Increased supply did not matter because 
when cigarettes had functioned as means of payment they often 
disappeared from circulation, in a manner of speaking they disappeared 
into thin air. Money had almost ceased to have a function. As store of 
wealth manufacturers, businessmen and storekeepers had hoarded all 
kinds of goods. The displays of the shops were empty; nobody wished to 
be paid in currency and everybody waited for the long-expected currency 
reform that was delayed by disputes of the four Allies about this 
subject. 
In secret new Deutschmarks (DM) had been printed in the United 
States and transported throughout West Germany. From June the 20th to 
June the 27th 1948 all Reichsmarks had to be handed in. From the 21st 
onward only Deutschmarks could be used as currency. Of the money that 
was handed in each person regained 40 DM, the rest was put on bank 
accounts that were all depreciated to 10%. Between the 20th of August 
and the llth of September another 20 DM per person could be obtained, 
of course under the condition that at least 60 Reichmarks were handed 
in in June. Only those who had no bank account were allowed to receive 
the deutschmarks at an exchange rate of 1:1, the so-called 'Kopfgeld'. 
The others had to pay more for the 60 DM, because all earlier deposits 
31
 V.A. de Ridder, 1948-1949, page 30-31. 
3 2
 Valery Janssens, page 322. 
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were depreciated to 10% too. The same depreciation was applied to all 
debts, including the debt of the Reich, mortgages, bank loans, and 
insurance policies. Firms and other employers were entitled to 60 DM 
per employee in order to meet the first week's payment. Of the bank 
accounts that were accumulated 50% would be released after approval of 
the tax authorities33 . On the 4th of October the other half of the 
balances was depreciated to 30%, one third to be used for investment in 
medium and long-term securities. Thereby the value of the money on the 
bank accounts was decreased to 6.5%. In this depreciation private 
claims were excluded. This policy was determined by the three western 
Allies. The then already residing German administration removed the the 
price and quantity controls. Rationing only remained for basic 
foodstuffs, rents, transportation, coal, iron and steel. A few months 
later also wage controls were abolished. 
The effects of the currency reform were startling. On the first 
day of the reform the shops were filled with goods again. This supply 
was the main reason for acceptance of money as measure of value by the 
population. Also absenteeism at work decreased from 9.5 hours a week in 
May to 4.2 hours in October3^; money had become more desirable as means 
of exchange. 
Still there was criticism on the implementation of the currency 
reform; not all property had been treated equally:35 
"... the owners of real assets were favoured compared 
with the holders of private claims in the form of 
loans or securities2 , and the latter were in turn 
favoured as compared with the owners of bank 
deposits, which were reduced in a larger portion than 
private claims; among the owners of liquid funds those 
were favoured who had little cash, since they obtained 
the "Kopfgeld" at the ratio of 1:1, whereas those with 
sufficiënt cash (including RM [Reichsmark] bank 
balances) lost at the ratio of 16:1." 
In July 1948 79% of the West Germans thought that certain strata of the 
population had gained advantages through the currency reform, 
particularly businessmen, manufacturers, and capitalists. Also the 
33
 This release was completed in January 1949. 
34
 F.A. Lutz, page 133. 
3 5
 F.A. Lutz, page 127. In his note 2 he remarks: "The owners of 
real estate have had their mortgage reduced in the ratio of 10:1; they 
continue, however, to pay interest on the fuil original amount of the 
mortgage, and nine-tenths of their payment goes to the land in which 
the property is situated." 
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destruction of savings and its consequences for savings morale were 
point of criticism. 
Social injustice was not unforeseen, however. As part of the first 
American currency plan in 1946 an equalisation of the war burden 
('Lastenausgleich') was built in. The Germans had already experienced 
one in 1924 after the currency reform of 1923/4. Yet at the last minute 
the Americans insisted on separating the monetary reform and the 
Lastenausgleich36. The Lastenausgleich was designed as a 
mortgage of 50% on the value of all real property and equity holdings. 
A fund was set up to accumulate repayment and interest payments. From 
this fund people would be paid who had suffered during the war, and who 
were victimized by the currency reform. Until 1974 the outlays of the 
fund were DM 94 billion, nearly as much as its inlays were37. But those 
Germans whose savings had vanished by the currency conversion were only 
compensated with two Deutschmarks for each ten Reichsmarks38. The rest 
of the expenditure of the fund went to expelled Germans, to victims of 
the war, and to compensations for lost property in the east of the 
German Reich39. 
In two countries, Rumania (August 1947) and East Germany (June 
1948), a quite similar currency reform was put into effect. However, 
these countries took redistributive measures concerning economie class 
and saving deposits respectively40. The reform in the Soviet zone of 
Germany was applied nearly at the same time as in the three other 
zones, and was a reaction on the currency measures in the latter areas. 
The Soviets therefore could not introducé a new currency immediately; 
they slightly changed the old banknotes. 
36
 Charles P. Kindleberger, in 'A Financial History of Western 
Europe', on page 418 claims that one person, Kenneth Royall, in nominal 
charge of the occupation forces, could prevent the Lastenausgleich with 
his ideological objection to capital levy as contrary to the American 
way of life. 
3 7
 Hans Möller, Die Westdeutsche Wahrungsreform von 1948, page 478. 
3 8
 Only savings, securities and life insurances kept from the 
first of January 1940 on, were compensated in this way. 
39
 Hans Möller, page 478. 
4 0
 In Rumania farmers were allowed to exchange 5 million lei per 
family and all the 'others 1.5 million lei per person (see F. Grotius, 
page 318). The currency reform in West Germany did not make distinction 
between economie classes but was disadvantagous for large money holders 
as for instance farmers. 
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4. Reconstruction policies; a discussion about the expansionist 
economie policies of the Western European countries in 1945-1947 
One of the economie features after World War Two was the 
increased importance of the dollar area in international trade. This 
resulted in a huge Western European trade deficit with the United 
States that would leave its mark upon the postwar period. In the 1930s 
these deficits had been financed by invisible earnings in dollars 
(shipping earnings, investment income, and tourist earnings in 
particular), and by export surpluses with other, so-called third areas 
in the world. The war and disinvestment in order to finance the primary 
reconstruction effort after the war had decreased the invisible 
earnings4*. A changing pattern of trade because of the war had 
diminished the possibilities of financing the dollar deficits through 
trade with third areas; these countries had increased trade with the 
United States themselves during the war, and during their own recovery 
after the war. The absence of food imports from Eastern Europe further 
reinforced the changing pattern in favour of the dollar area. The 
disappearance of Germany from the international markets also had this 
influence, mainly in coal, iron and capital goods. A serious dollar 
shortage developed, because Europe could not finance the increased 
dependence on particularly the United States; exports to the United 
States could not match the imports from this nation, and financing 
through disinvestment and monetary 
reserves could not be prolonged for long42. Two years after the war 
had ended serious payment problems arose (see table 4). The bad winter 
of 1946/7 and a poor harvest in 1947 aggravated this because of 
shortages in coal and food. 
41
 The members of the CEEC (Committee of European Economie 
Cooperation, see not 50 for the members), later OEEC (Organization for 
European Economie Cooperation) in 1938 had a surplus on invisibles of 
approximately $ 2000 million (OEEC-figures). The balance of the 
invisibles on the current account in 1947 is recorded to be a $ 750 
million deficit. Figures of the IMF (International Monetary Fund), 
however, suggest an equilibrium in 1947. The deterioration of the 
invisible earnings was approximately a quarter or a third of the 
overall deterioration of the balance of payments between 1938 and 1947 
(see Alan Milward (1984), page 42). 
4 2
 In 1947 Western Europe lost about $ 2500 million in gold and 
dollar holdings, about a third of its total holdings at the beginning 
of the year. During 1947 the gold and dollar holdings of the United 
Kingdom, which were also those of the sterling area, decreased to 
approximately half the size of the total gold and dollar drain of that 
year. The gold and dollar holdings of France and the Netherlands 
decreased to approximately one-third, and those of Italy to 
approximately one-tenth. In Denmark foreign exchange reserves even 
dropped below normal working balances. 
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table 4-Deficits on merchandise trade of OEEC countries with 
the United State s (million current doll ars) 
country 1946 1947 
Austria ( + ) 0.56 ( + ) 0.38 
Belgium/Luxembourg 192.07 457.38 
Denmark 42.38 104.96 
France 649.13 956.19 
Italy 112.19 350.06 
Netherlands 187.13 431.13 
Norway 82.28 173.43 
United Kingdom 764.07 950.08 
source: Alan S. Milward, 1984, page 26. 
What were the reasons of the deterioration of the balance of 
payments? Alan Milward rejects the commonly accepted view that food and 
coal shortages in Western Europe were of importance. He also disagrees 
with the opinion that there was a general economie stagnation in 
Western Europe with deteriorating social conditions, an opinion that 
was common among United States' policy makers and that is the 
conventional view43. In hls opinion it was not the stagnation of 
recovery, but the increased level of investment in machinery, steel, 
and vehicles that caused the growing dollar shortage of Western 
43
 Undersecretary Clayton of the United States government who 
played an important role in stimulating the Marshall Plan, had visited 
Europe. In his view Europe was in grave distress, leading to a 
breakdown of market connections between city and countryside. The 
United States policy makers were afraid of the consequences they 
expected from a Western European economie collapse. They were worried 
about the growing communist influence and gave special financial 
assistance to France and Italy in the winter of 1946/7, as president 
Truman stated, to help both countries "survive this critical winter as 
f ree and independent nations" (Harry B. Price, The Marshall Plan and 
lts Meaning, page 47). See John Gimbel, chapter one, for a synopsis of 
the different views on the motives of the United States policy makers. 
Although Milward acknowledges that agricultural production in 
Western Europe was well below its average level of the period 1934-
1938, he is not convinced of a decreasing Standard of living in 1947 
(page 13). According to him calorie intake per person increased, and 
also infant mortality rates improved to at least pre-war level in 
almost every country. Even the Standard of living (i.e. the movement of 
money wages plotted against the movement of the cost of living index, 
or of the retail prices) did not decrease in 1947 as compared to 1946, 
except in Italy, France and Belgium. 
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Europe44. In other words, instead of a stagnation it was on the 
contrary the success of recovery that caused the trade deficits. 
Milward finds it amazing that government policies of low interest 
rates, trade controls, and public funds aimed at stimulating 
investment, remained so stubbom when the available European sources of 
finance for imports had dried up45. He considers European economie 
policies as overambitious and too expansionistic, and even compares the 
Western European countries with lemmings that more or less deliberately 
foliowed a fatalistic direction, under the assumption that the United 
States would eventually have to act. The European Recovery Program 
(ERP) or Marshall Plan, in his view, justified this assumption46, and 
enabled the countries to continue their expansionistic policies. 
Milward was not the only one with this opinion; already in the 1940s a 
group of economists considered Western Europe to live beyond its 
means47. In their view the high spending of the governments and the 
corresponding inflation policies encouraged imports, increased domestic 
demand at the expense of exports and therefore delayed the attainment 
of a external equilibrium. They stated that the balance of payments 
problem could be solved in the short term, provided that inflation 
would be stopped, and overvalued exchange rates adjusted. Exchange 
controls could be loosened then, and quotas for goods eliminated. 
Seymour E. Harris, among others in the 1940s, thought that this 
view was oversimplifying the situation when heavy disinvestments during 
44
 Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51, 
1984, page 36. 
4 5
 Especially investment in transport and communication was high, 
for instance ship building received priority (Alan S. Milward, page 
38). The advantage of having ships again was that the high costs of 
using American ships would be avoided. But most of the steel had to be 
imported from the United States because of a low permitted output of 
the German steel industry. This also had its effects on the dollar 
balances. By the end of 1949 the priority given to shipbuilding in most 
Western European countries resulted in larger fleets than before the 
war. 
46
 Alan S. Milward, page 49-51. He especially mentions France and 
the United Kingdom. 
4 7
 See for instance Gottfried Haberler in The American Economie 
Review of September 1948, page 509. Others who shared this opinion were 
Graham, Machlup, Lutz, Viner, Harrod and Hazlitt. According to them and 
Milward the Marshall Plan was not needed, with the notable exception 
made by Milward for France and the Netherlands. 
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the war were considered48. He also did not agree with the opinion that 
devaluation of overvalued currencies was of first-rate importance, 
because exports could not be increased sufficiently due to scarce 
production facilities. In his opinion it was the allocation of 
recources that was of the utmost importance to yield the largest 
supply of dollars. According to Harris circumstances with regard to 
growing industrialization, real costs, demand, and the effects of post-
war patterns of trade restriction were too uncertain to determine 
suitable exchange rates in 1947. He considered price increases in the 
United States as decisive for the dollar gap, something Milward does 
not mention. In 1946 in the United States the Price Control Bill was 
not renewed, this increased prices considerably49, and, according to 
Harris, thereby worsened the European dollar position:50 
"Of Europe's total adverse balance of $ 7.5 billion 
in 1947 the rise in trade deficit (in 1938 dollars) 
accounted for about a sixth, the rise of interna-
tional prices for almost one-half, and the losses on 
invisibles accounted for little more than one-
third." 
On the trade balance about three quarters of the growing deficit 
during the period 1938-1947 can be explained by the increase in the 
prices of international commodities51 (see table 5). Comparing 1946 to 
1947 increased prices accounted for 86% of the growing trade deficit. 
4 8
 Seymour E. Harris, The European Recovery Program, page 41. 
1,9
 Using 1938-1939 as a Standard, the index of American wholesale 
prices between June 1946 and February 1948 increased from 147 to 210, 
retail prices increased from 150 to 192 (see Van der Wee, De gebroken 
welvaartscirkel, page 16). 
5 0
 Seymour E. Harris, page 51. With Europe Harris meant the 
sixteen ERP countries and West Germany; Eastern Europe was excluded. 
The sixteen ERP countries were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. 
51
 The difference in the deficit between 1938 and 1947 (in 1938 
prices) is approximately 1.200, using current prices this difference is 
4.800. This makes prices to cause a three quarter difference of 3.600 
(see table 5). 
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On the current account of the trade balance this was 91% 5 2. 
Interpreting figures in this way, however, can be misleading. Because 
when we consider price indices, comparing 1938 and 1947, the prices of 
exports and imports both increased to 210%, What really was the problem 
of Europe, was the fact that imports far exceeded exports. As a result, 
a price change of imports equal to, or even less than a price change of 
exports would enlarge the trade deficit (low elasticity). Thus, extra 
price increases in the United States during 1947 worsened the European 
dollar position, although in 1947 the terms of trade were probably 
above the 1938-level53. 
table 5-Europe's trade with non-European countries (millions of 
dollars) 
1938 1946 1947 
current current 1938 current 1938 
prices prices prices prices prices 
Imports, f.o.b.(a) 5.820 9.400 5.350 13.000 6.200 
Exports, f.o.b.(a) 3.730 4.300 2.300 6.100 2.900 
Trade deficit -2.090 -5.100 -3.050 -6.900 -3.300 
source: Seymour E. Harris, page 50 
(a) Free on board 
Using other sources Robert Triffin thought price changes to have 
had a 20% influence on the growing trade deficit between 1938 and 1947, 
and volume changes to have had a 80% influence. He nevertheless also 
mentioned price movements as a major cause of the 1947 deficit5A. What 
is of importance here is that the Western European trade deficit could 
not be reduced as easily as Alan Milward and Haberler c.s. suggested. 
In f act, this reduction was not desirable. I will comment on this 
further. 
5 2
 Giorgio Fodor, Why Did Europe Need The Marshall Plan, page 20. 
Fodor uses the same figures as Harris. 
53
 Robert Triffin, Europe and the Money Muddie, pages 32 and 315. 
Terms of trade are defined as the ratio of the average value indices of 
exports and imports. Average value indices are calculated by dividing 
value indices by volume indices. 
54
 Robert Triffin, pages 32 and 313. Volume changes were the 
result of low exports (in 1938 prices) compared to 1938, whereas 
imports in 1947 (in 1838 prices) were approximately at the 1938-level. 
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The balance of payments problems in the late 1940s look a lot like 
the problems many developing countries experience in the late 1970s and 
in the 1980s: problems concerning production and sale, and a big need 
for imports. And most important of all, a need for foreign capital 
goods. Then a deficit on the current account of the balance of payment 
is necessary, as was the case in the United States in the nineteenth 
century and in Europe after World War Two. As the developing countries 
do now, several development paths were taken in Europe. In the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Germany and the Scandinavian countries 
the economy was regulated with wage, price, export and import controls 
and sometimes with rationing. In the United Kingdom this policy was 
continued for a long time; the last rations disappeared in 1954. Gther 
countries did not eliminate market forces as much. Belgium promoted 
economie recovery by liberating most constraints on consumption, those 
on foreign exchange included. In Italy and France effective price and 
distribution controls were absent, wages foliowed the high increase in 
prices and the currencies depreciated continuously. The social effects 
of inflation on wealth and income were generally allowed to work 
themselves out in both countries. All Western European nations tried to 
increase capital formation as much as possible. As is the case with 
many developing countries nowadays, this expansionary policy was 
criticized as being overexpansionary because of balance of payments 
problems. Monetary reserves declined because of the deficits and for 
this reason the continuance of this policy could not last long. All 
countries chose not to deflate, Italy excepted. 
In the Netherlands the dilemma of the choice between further 
limiting imports and deflation policies was shown by the Minister of 
Finance Lieftinck who declared imports difficult to reduce. On the 
other hand, according to him, a reduction of consumption would decrease 
productivity and stimulate black market trade, and a reduction of 
investment would hamper production and export55. Late December 1947 the 
government of the Netherlands in spite of fastly decreasing monetary 
reserves decided to wait for the American aid that was expected. 
Nevertheless, cuts on imports of especially dollar goods had already 
been enacted a few months before. Gther countries changed their policy 
more clearly: in Austria a third currency reform was introduced in 
November/December 1947, in France a program of tax increase and a 
second currency reform were executed, and Italy announced a severe 
anti-inflationary program, the United Kingdom reached a budget surplus 
for the fiscal year 1948, and in Belgium import controls for dollar 
goods were reinstituted in September 1947. So Western European 
countries did act and could not really be called 'lemmings', as Alan 
Milward did. To most Western European countries in 1947 the alternative 
of further deflation, and for some the balancing of the budget, was not 
acceptable in a situation in which exports contrary to imports were far 
below pre-war level, and in which social welfare was still low. 
5 5
 Pierre van der Eng, De Marshall-hulp een perspectief voor 
Nederland 1947-1953, page 45. 
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5. The restrengthening of market forces 
After the 1947-'crisis' a next important moment in reconstruction 
was formed by the wave of devaluations in 1949. A policy measure 
classically oriented economists had wished to happen in 1947/48, but 
that had been rejected by others as premature. 
The revival of the foreign exchange system was started in the last 
phase of the war. New exchange rates had to be determined to facilitate 
financial transactions between countries. Conditions, however, were not 
favorable, particularly not where governments were in exile. They had 
to rely on information via underground sources in the calculation of 
what might be the effect of enemy withdrawal. The effects of the war 
were hard to estimate, consequently the exchange rates had to be 
considered as provisional. An important consideration was that the 
exchange rate ought to contribute to reconstruction, and especially to 
favorable effects on inflation. This resulted in overvalued currencies 
in relation to the dollar and to a lesser degree to the pound sterling 
in 194456, which were safeguarded by foreign exchange controls. First 
and foremost internal recovery and stabilization had to be achieved 
again, before exchange rates would play their role in the economy once 
more. 
In the late 1940s increasing production, and a more stabilized 
money supply decreased the threat of inflation in several Western 
European countries, except in Austria, France, Greece and Italy. 
Recovery was not fully reached in the late fourties, but relaxation of 
controls was started. In the Netherlands for instance the government 
decided to liberate price controls and rationing gradually. More and 
more market forces were allowed to influence national economies again. 
In the case of the Netherlands import prices could affect interior 
prices more now. Therefore ultimately the overvalued exchange rate 
would have to be adjusted in order to remain competitive on the world 
market. 
The devaluation of the pound sterling in September 1949 was the 
start of a whole series of currency adjustments. The United Kingdom, 
like other Western European countries, still had a gold and dollar 
deficit with hard-currency nations. An export surplus to other 
countries, on the other hand, yielded a surplus of inconvertible 
currencies such as the Dutch guilder and the French franc. Therefore 
there were balance of payments problems in the United Kingdom, 
although the current account was nearly in balance in 1948 and 1949. A 
combination of events was the cause of the devaluation that eventually 
took place four years after the war57. There was an increase in British 
imports from the United States during the second quarter of 1949, which 
was foliowed by a deliberate cut in imports during the following 
56
 Frank A. Southard, The Finances of European Liberation, with 
special Reference to Italy, page 142. 
57
 See also Alec Cairncross, Years of Recovery. British Economie 
Policy 1945-51, chapter 7. 
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quarter by the United Kingdom, and by the Commonwealth as well. Since 
the monetary reserves of the United Kingdom were also those of the 
Commonwealth, the behaviour of this group of countries was important, 
especially when the reserves were not high, as was the case in 1949. 
In addition to this the United States feil into a mild depression, and 
bought less primary products from Commonwealth nations like Malaya and 
Australia; a further drain of monetary reserves was the result58. 
Furthermore there was some pressure from the United States and Canada 
to adjust the exchange rate of the pound sterling. This strengthened 
market opinion, and expectations of devaluation arose, which encouraged 
all kinds of anticipation such as the discouragement of the holding of 
sterling, deterrence of purchases payable in sterling, a flight of 
capital, and probably a delay in British exports to the dollar area. 
This market behaviour was a decisive factor in the British decision to 
devaluate59. 
The decrease of the exchange rate tö $2.80 per pound was chosen in 
order to avoid a second devaluation60. The measure was accompanied with 
a moderate program of cuts in State spending, and by an agreement with 
the trade unions to continue the standstill in wages as long as prices 
did not increase more than five percent. The British devaluation was 
foliowed by many countries in Western Europe (see table 6), partly 
because of the same reasons, but mainly in order to restore the 
competitive relations. 
The effects of the devaluation on trade are hard to measure. Other 
economie developments impede this, namely the increase of coal, steel 
and grain production in Western Europe, and the rapid acceleration of 
Western European exports to the United States in 1950 when economie 
activity in the United States recovered and hostilities in Korea 
started. One important effect may have been that the increase in prices 
of dollar goods reduced the demand for these goods to below the level 
of actual imports during the period before the devaluation, thereby 
releasing dollars for the import of other commodities, and decreasing 
5 8
 The gold and dollar reserves feil from £471 million at the end 
of March to £330 million on 18 September. 
59
 A. Cairncross (page 206): "It is significant, for example 
that, although the trade deficit of the sterling area with the United 
States feil by $100 million in the third quarter, the loss of reserves 
up to 18 September was higher than in the second quarter, and in the 
last 30 days before devaluation amounted to £42 million (compared with 
£65 million in the whole of the second quarter)." 
6 0
 "When the Chancelor came to expound the decision to the House 
of Commons on 27 September he laid stress on two factors. First there 
was the need to put British exporters to North American markets in 'a 
fairly competitive position'; this seemed to call for a rate as low as 
$ 3 especially as some cheap sterling transactions were taking place 
below this rate. There was, second, a need for finality: the rate had 
to be low enough to remove any danger of a second devaluation." (Alec 
Cairncross, page 187). 
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the pressure on the control authorities. Anyhow, in 1950 and the 
following years price controls and rationing were dismantled in 
countries where they still existed. A clear effect after the 
devaluations was the reversal of the capital movements towards Western 
Europe. 
table 6-The extent of European currency deva-
luations re lative to the dollar (in %) 
United Kingdom 30.5 
Denmark 30.5 
Norway 30.5 
Netherlands 30.2 
France 21.8 
West Germany 20.6 
Belgium/Luxembourg 13.0 
Italy 8.0 
source: Alan S. Milward, page 293. 
Since the Korea-boom the payments surplus of the United States 
decreased sharply, while countries in Western Europe experienced 
balance of payments surpluses. As a consequence the so-called dollar 
shortage disappeared, which was a clear signal of continued recovery. 
The payment surpluses coincided with a rapid relaxation of import and 
exchange restrictions. 
Prices were remarkably stable in most countries, though the 
overliquidity of the banking system was still present. During the war 
the Western European nations had financed their budget deficits on the 
money and capital markets. The banks on the Continent largely financed 
these deficits, and bought many Treasury bills that could be converted 
into money in a short term. After the war this situation contained the 
imminent danger that the lending to the government would not be 
continued at the due data of the Treasury bills, and that instead, the 
lending to the private sector would be enlarged in an uncontrollable 
way. In Italy this actually happened. In Belgium in 1946 was decreed 
that in the larger banks 65% of the short-term assets would have to be 
in the form of cash and Treasury certificates6*. Nevertheless, an 
important part of the private sector did not have to borrow from the 
banks; in several countries they could not buy as much as they wished 
as a consequence of the demand control systems. The liquidity of the 
61
 Léon H. Dupriez, page 72. In this way the market of Treasury 
certificates expanded when the bank deposits expanded. The banks had to 
rediscount at the Banque Nationale when they wished to expand their 
credit in a situation in which they had reached the ceiling of 65%. 
Then an increased discount rate would become effective. Dupriez added 
that somewhat lower figures were set for smaller banks. 
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private sector stimulated low interest rates and favoured governments 
who were the only large borrowers62. The so-called cheap money made 
borrowing attractive, but was a psychological hindrance for the 
consolidation of the short-term government debt into longer terms; only 
those amounts were Consolidated that would not influence the interest 
rates. So when the 1950s came a large part of the consolidation still 
had to take place in some countries. In 1951 this happened in the 
United Kingdom (and in the United States) and in 1952 and 1954 in the 
Netherlands. 
The beginning of the 1950s also meant a start of monetary policy 
by the central banks. For the first time since the war these monetary 
authorities increased the discount rate in Western Germany, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. In Italy this had already happened 
in 1947 as a part of the deflation policy with its credit restrictions, 
and in September 1948 in France along with quantitative measures as the 
institution of reserve requirements for the banks and a limit for 
rediscounting at the Banque de France. In Belgium the government did 
not regulate long term interest rates, with the consequence that money 
in Belgium was 'more expensive'. The consolidation of government debt 
in the other countries, and consequently the decreased liquidity of the 
banks, after a while made the interest policy of central banks more 
effective again as an instrument to control credits to the private 
sector. The reinstatement of the role of the central banks is another 
signal of restoration of pre-war economie relations. 
Trade relations in Western Europe became more normal as well. In 
1950 the European Payment Union was founded with starting capital from 
the Marshall plan. The European Payment Union was a multilateral 
clearing institute that facilitated trade in Western Europe, and 
removed the disadvantages of bilateral trade agreements63. By 1952 the 
6 2
 The discount rate in Norway, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom was 1.5 to 4%. In Western Germany it was kept at 5% all the 
time, but af ter June 1948 it reached a maximum of 6% in 1950; bef ore 
that, other credit restrictions had decreased the liquidity of the 
banks. In Italy it was raised from 4 to 5.5% in 1947 as a part of the 
deflation policy. In France a cheap money policy was pursued in a more 
active way. Warren C. Baum, The French Economy and the State, page 61: 
"... the government sought ambivalently to facilitate the use of credit 
for the recovery of business activity while attempting to dicourage its 
use for "inflationary" purposes." In January 1945 the Banque de France 
had reduced the discount rate to 1.625%. 
6 3
 Before, the CEEC countries had set up a common fund in October 
1948. In this fund 'soft' currencies were made available; net-creditors 
to the fund would get 'hard' Marshall dollars instead. The arrangement, 
however, was still based on bilateral relations, because automatic 
clearing was applied before drawing rights could be executed. After a 
year 25% of the drawing rights from the fund were made multilateral; 
June 1950 this was 100%. From October 1950 on the European Payment 
Union organized this multilateral payment scheme (see Pierre van der 
Eng, page 71/2). 
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extreme pressures of the immediate post-war period had almost 
disappeared. Some restrictions on prices, wages and trade still 
existed. Restoration of fuil convertibility, which would be an 
important step to full liberalization of the trade in goods and 
services, had to wait until 1958. 
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